关于以下功能,我的调试器在完成此功能时会向我显示__stack_chk_fail。
我的系统是Mac OS。
这是因为我的堆栈通过检查引用而溢出。
同样根据我的实验,如果设置vocab_size = 30000,则会显示__stack_chk_fail错误,但是当vocab_size = 20000时,它就可以了。
所以我相信
vocab = (struct vocab_word *)malloc ((size_t) ((vocab_size + 1) * sizeof(struct vocab_word)));
是个问题。但是malloc在堆上分配内存而不是堆栈,所以我想知道我哪里出错了?
void populate_vocab(){
FILE *fin;
fin = fopen(word_file, "rb");
vocab = (struct vocab_word *)malloc ((size_t) ((vocab_size + 1) * sizeof(struct vocab_word)));
char word[MAX_STRING];
int word_idx = 0;
int num = 0;
boolean word_mode = 1;
long long cur_vocab_size = 0;
while (!feof(fin)) {
ch = fgetc(fin);
if(ch == ' '){
word_mode = 0;
}else if(ch == '\n'){
word_mode = 1;
word[word_idx] = 0;
vocab[cur_vocab_size].word = (char *)calloc(word_idx, sizeof(char));
strcpy(vocab[cur_vocab_size].word,word);
vocab[cur_vocab_size].cn = num;
cur_vocab_size++;
if (cur_vocab_size >= vocab_size){
break;
}
//fresh var
word_idx = 0;
num = 0;
}else{
if(word_mode){
word[word_idx] = ch;
word_idx ++;
}else{
num = num * 10;
num += ch - '0';
}
}
}
fclose(fin);
}
答案 0 :(得分:3)
根据评论,我找出原因。 其中一个字超过MAX_STRING,导致堆栈溢出。
答案 1 :(得分:0)
我建议在Valgrind或AddressSanitizer下运行崩溃的程序。在最新的macOS上,仅AddressSanitizer可用。
__stack_chk_fail
崩溃后的Stacktrace仅告诉您在哪里检测到了问题(使堆栈崩溃的堆栈溢出)。当发生溢出时,AddressSanitizer可以正确告诉您。
要使用AddressSanitizer,请使用最新的clang或gcc并使用标志进行编译
clang -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -O1 -g hello.c
AddressSanitizer的报告如下所示
$ ../cmake-build-debug/cpp/examples/broker
broker listening on 5672
=================================================================
==42793==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x70000c4bcbe0 at pc 0x0001013663e1 bp 0x70000c4bc830 sp 0x70000c4bc828
WRITE of size 8 at 0x70000c4bcbe0 thread T3
#0 0x1013663e0 in pni_split_mechs sasl.c:443
#1 0x1013646ea in pni_post_sasl_frame sasl.c:480
#2 0x101357fad in pn_output_write_sasl sasl.c:677
#3 0x101323909 in transport_produce transport.c:2751
#4 0x10131ffd3 in pn_transport_pending transport.c:3030
#5 0x1012b8755 in pn_connection_driver_write_buffer connection_driver.c:120
#6 0x10120240f in leader_process_pconnection libuv.c:909
#7 0x1011f8b48 in leader_lead_lh libuv.c:1008
#8 0x1011f94f3 in pn_proactor_wait libuv.c:1062
#9 0x10188c55d in proton::container::impl::thread() proactor_container_impl.cpp:753
#10 0x1018bca31 in void* std::__1::__thread_proxy<std::__1::tuple<std::__1::unique_ptr<std::__1::__thread_struct, std::__1::default_delete<std::__1::__thread_struct> >, void (proton::container::impl::*)(), proton::container::impl*> >(void*) thread:352
#11 0x7fff6987f2ea in _pthread_body (libsystem_pthread.dylib:x86_64+0x32ea)
#12 0x7fff69882248 in _pthread_start (libsystem_pthread.dylib:x86_64+0x6248)
#13 0x7fff6987e40c in thread_start (libsystem_pthread.dylib:x86_64+0x240c)
Address 0x70000c4bcbe0 is located in stack of thread T3 at offset 192 in frame
#0 0x101363ccf in pni_post_sasl_frame sasl.c:462
This frame has 3 object(s):
[32, 48) 'out' (line 464)
[64, 192) 'mechs' (line 475) <== Memory access at offset 192 overflows this variable
[224, 228) 'count' (line 478)
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
Thread T3 created by T0 here:
#0 0x101f5dadd in wrap_pthread_create (libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64+0x56add)
#1 0x1018bc4ab in std::__1::thread::thread<void (proton::container::impl::*)(), proton::container::impl*, void>(void (proton::container::impl::*&&)(), proton::container::impl*&&) thread:368
#2 0x10188da97 in proton::container::impl::run(int) proactor_container_impl.cpp:802
#3 0x100f0223c in main broker.cpp:427
#4 0x7fff6968b3d4 in start (libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x163d4)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow sasl.c:443 in pni_split_mechs
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x1e0001897920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e0001897930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e0001897940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e0001897950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e0001897960: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
=>0x1e0001897970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2
0x1e0001897980: 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e0001897990: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e00018979a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e00018979b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1e00018979c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==42793==ABORTING
Abort trap: 6